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7.1  Introduction 
Since its enactment, the Social Security System has enjoyed unique 
popularity among public income support programs. In the past several 
years, however, rising payroll taxes, a huge long-term deficit, and con- 
cerns over its effects on the economy have led an increasing number of 
observers to conclude that social security is in urgent need of reform. 
This system serves two major goals: to replace income lost at retire- 
ment, and to provide minimum income support for the aged. The former, 
the insurance goal,  is  based  on earned entitlements; the welfare,  or 
transfer, goal aims at social adequacy of support. Each goal enjoys wide 
public support as well as important policy justifications. For example, 
imperfections in the private  annuities market and imperfect foresight 
regarding future incomes, inflation, life expectancy, etc., may lead many 
citizens to “undersave” for retirement, forcing them to become general 
charges on the public via welfare or other programs in the absence of 
social security. 
Over more than four decades, the Social Security System has helped 
mitigate these problems in an important way. It has provided substantial 
income security to the elderly; it has kept many elderly persons out of 
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extreme poverty; and it has transferred billions of  dollars annually from 
the younger, wealthier generation of  workers to  the older, poorer genera- 
tion of retirees. These are significant achievements indeed. However, the 
system, which was designed decades ago, has not kept up fully with 
rapidly  changing economic,  social,  and demographic  conditions.  It is 
having several substantial and probably unintended adverse effects on 
the overall economy; and it faces a long-term funding crisis of substantial 
proportions. 
Social security is thought of  in several alternative ways: as an actuari- 
ally fair pension fund; as a separable system of  taxes and transfer pay- 
ments; and as a pure consumption loan intergenerational transfer pro- 
gram, where each generation transfers a fraction of its labor income to 
the retired generation with the expectation that the succeeding genera- 
tion  will  treat it  similarly.  In truth, the existing  Old Age Survivors 
Insurance (OASI) System is none of the above, but has components of 
each (as well as additional complexities). 
The current system differs from the private pension fund analogue in 
several respects. First, it is unfunded in that current payouts are financed 
by contemporaneous “contributions,” or taxes. This had the advantage 
of allowing retirement benefits to be initiated immediately, making the 
initial recipients “windfall”  beneficiaries. That is, they received retire- 
ment income supplements with little or no previous contributions. In- 
come was similarly transferred from the initial working population to  the 
initial retirement generation. This intergenerational  transfer  has con- 
tinued as the system has matured, although the percentage of  net trans- 
fers (the expected value of a participant’s receipts less payments) in total 
benefits has diminished. One drawback of this system is that while people 
accumulate future claims against the system, no corresponding wealth 
accumulation occurs for the system as a whole. Thus, while the working 
population is being forced to “save,” no funds are madeavailable for 
capital formation in the economy. At any point in time, the system is 
“bankrupt” in that it has massive future retirement obligations and only a 
relatively  trivial amount of  assets. A government  can operate such a 
system because of its powers to tax future income in order to finance its 
obligations. 
There are other major differences between  social security  and the 
private annuity or pension  fund analogue.  The benefits are distinctly 
tilted in favor of the low-income worker, the worker with a short work 
history, and the retiree with a spouse  with an uncovered work history and 
those with little retirement income. That is, relative to a system where 
each participant earned a common rate of return on his or her contribu- 
tions, the current Social Security  System involves a set of  taxes and 
transfers.  This  redistribution  within  a  generation, in  contrast  to the 
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mechanisms  as a progressive benefit formula, a minimum benefit, a 
uniform dependent’s benefit, and an earnings test. 
7.2  The Major Problems Confronting Social Security 
Three major sets of problems plague social security today. The first is 
the issue of equity, both inter- and intragenerational. A large proportion 
of  benefits received by  retired workers is really an intergenerational 
transfer. Also, different groups in a given generation of  the population 
are treated differently by the Social Security System. Low-income work- 
ers receive a higher fraction of their previous earnings in benefits than do 
high-income workers, married couples usually receive half again as much 
as single persons with the same earnings history for the primary earner, 
those with short-covered earnings histories are favored, etc. 
A second set of  problems plaguing the Social Security System is the 
potentially adverse effects that it may have on private incentives to work, 
save, hire workers, etc. 
Probably the most overwhelming problem confronting social security 
as a pay-as-you-go system is the long-term funding crisis. Even after the 
1977 social security amendments,  the long-term deficit in the OASI 
System was well over $600 billion (in 1977 dollars). By 1982 this amount 
had increased to well over one trillion dollars. This is the amount by 
which the present value of legislated benefits exceeds the present value of 
legislated taxes. To  put this in perspective, this amount is about the size of 
the privately held regular national debt. The major cause of  this pro- 
jected deficit is the drastic change in the age structure of the population. 
Once the post-World  War I1 baby boom retires (around 2010) the ratio of 
retirees to workers will increase enormously. The best estimate is that the 
ratio of retirees to workers will increase by over 60%-from  slightly less 
than one to three to about one to two. Given the pay-as-you-go nature of 
the system, this implies either a huge increase in taxes to maintain the 
ratio of benefits to before-tax wages or a significant decline in the ratio. 
Neither prospect is appealing, but there is no avoiding the choice. 
In addition to  the rapidly changing age structure of the population, the 
trend to earlier retirement combined with increased life expectancy has 
increased the average length of retirement considerably. In 1948  one-half 
of  all males over the age of sixty-five were in the labor force; today that 
figure is only one in five. The average life expectancy of the elderly has 
increased over two years since 1960. Thus the length of  the average 
retirement period has increased by about one-third since 1950. This has 
greatly strained the financial resources of  the elderly; to achieve any 
given level of  annual consumption, a retiree now needs substantially 
greater savings, intrafamily transfers, or public support. 
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security? Even the large tax increases of the 1977 amendments will prove 
insufficient to finance the program through the first half  of  the next 
century. If  the current law is maintained until 2025, payroll tax rates 
would have to increase by more than 8 percentage points to meet benefit 
payments.’ This would imply combined employer and employee tax rates 
of  about 23% of  payroll! Given the huge outcry against the large (but 
much smaller) increases legislated in 1977, it is clear that the time has 
come to reexamine the future course of social security. The alternative is 
continued unpopular tax increases, which add to costs and prices, reduce 
net wage rates, redirect the system further from an earned entitlements 
or annuity basis,  and continually erode public support of  the Social 
Security System. 
While several short-run “quick fixes” have been proposed, such as 
bringing  into the system those, such as government  employees, not 
currently included, or eliminating the ceiling on taxable earnings, these 
cannot  produce  a reduction  in the  long-term  deficit unless they  are 
accomplished in  a manner  that is  actuarially disadvantageous to the 
groups concerned.2  For example, bringing government employees under 
social security would increase current tax revenues but add to future 
obligations. This could reduce the deficit only if  government employees 
were given a “bad” deal. But we could then expect them to resist such a 
proposal en masse. 
7.3 
In order to appreciate the relation between the annuity and the in- 
tergenerational transfer components of  social security, let us  begin by 
examining the most extreme case: the first cohort of  retirees under the 
United States Social Security System. Consider an individual who was 
age sixty-two in 1937 and retired in 1940 at age sixty-five. 
For a worker making average earnings and investing the sum of  em- 
ployer and employee contributions at interest rates then prevailing, the 
accumulated retirement principal in 1940 would have been only $68.36, 
yielding an annuity of  $6.59 per year. Clearly, benefits far in excess of 
contributions would be required if  any substantial benefits were to be 
paid. 
The actual average annual benefit paid in 1940 to a male age sixty-five 
was $270.60. Since an annuity would have yielded only $6.59, $264.01 of 
the benefits were a pure transfer, or welfare payment.’ Since the benefits 
The Transfer and Annuity Components of  Social Security 
1. See Robertson (1978). The 8 percentage point increase includes that estimated to 
2.  They might be defensible on other grounds. 
3.  This example is taken from Parsons and Munro (1977). 
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may  and, in  fact, did change over the retirement period, it  is more 
convenient to compare capitalized savings and benefits over the expected 
time span than to compare annuity payments and annual benefits. For the 
individual  in  question,  the  present  value  of  lifetime  benefits  was 
$2,962.09, of which $2,893.73  was a transfer. Thus this individual paid for 
only 2.3% of  the benefits received. This percentage has been increasing 
for individuals over time. Those retiring at age sixty-five in 1970 paid for 
approximately 32% of  the benefits received. 
Different indivduals receive vastly different “deals” in the sense of the 
ratio of  benefits received to taxes paid plus interest. This occurs for a 
number of  reasons including the progressive benefit formula, the mini- 
mum benefit, the spouse’s benefit, the different periods of coverage, etc. 
7.4  Separating the Transfer and Insurance Components 
Many problems in the Social Security System relate to the conflict 
between its twin goals of earned benefits and income adequacy. Most 
critics of the program propose reforming it in the direction of one goal or 
the other. Separating the transfer and annuity goals would have different 
effects on individuals depending on their age, income, industry, etc. 
The three sets of  problems plaguing social security-the  long-term 
funding deficit, the apparent inequities, and the adverse incentives- 
have generated much interest in reforming the system. One proposed 
reform is the separation of the transfer and annuity goals of the program. 
In principle, it may be desirable to separate the financing of these differ- 
ent goals of the system. Separating the transfer and annuity functions of 
the Social Security System and funding them respectively out of general 
revenues and earmarked payroll taxes has been  recommended for a 
number of  reasons. 
First, the current  system is so complex as to obscure the relation 
between contributions and benefits and impede a rationalization by firms 
and employees of  total retirement support, private pension plus social 
security. 
Second, as we shall demonstrate below, many groups in the population 
are getting a “bad” deal from social security compared to an actuarily fair 
system. Separating the transfer and annuity goals would provide the same 
rate of  return for  all workers under social security’s  annuity program. The 
inequities which undermine support of the system would be eliminated in 
this part of  the program. 
Third, transfers to the elderly poor (beyond Supplemental Security 
Income) could be financed from general revenues. Many object to financ- 
ing an income guarantee for the aged poor from a tax which bears so 
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deductions, and low-income allowance, which together exempt the first 
several thousand dollars of earnings from tax, indicate the general belief 
that those at the very bottom of the income scale should not have to help 
finance general income support programs. 
The same argument applies to any intergenerational transfers provid- 
ing earnings-related benefits beyond those provided by pure insurance 
and the minimum income guarantee. Many object to a system in which 
current unskilled workers surrender income (beyond their own  insur- 
ance) to subsidize retired professionals beyond what is actuarially fair. 
In separating the insurance from the transfer goals, general revenue 
financing would also require the transfer goals to compete openly with 
other government priorities, including tax cuts. General revenue financ- 
ing would permit policymakers and the public openly to determine the 
value of transfers to the elderly in relation to other social priorities and to 
promote cost-effective measures for doing so. It will permit differential 
needs assessment to deal with different circumstances (marital status, 
etc.) in the context of  a transfer program, where many precedents for 
doing so already exist. 
7.5  Toward a Solution 
As  we  begin  to grapple with  the problems  of  the  Social Security 
System, from the apparent inequities and inefficiencies to the long-term 
deficit, serious consideration is being given to two major reforms: sepa- 
rating the dual functions of social security and financing them separately, 
and raising average retirement ages. Separating the transfer component 
of  the system (and funding it out of  general revenues) would encourage 
more cost-effective transfers and enable us to strengthen the earned 
entitlement functions, which, in turn, would eliminate many inequities 
and help restore public confidence in the financial integrity of the system. 
Raising retirement ages would relieve much of the financial pressure on 
social security and make much sense in view of  other labor force and 
demographic changes. 
In what follows we have analyzed a series of  long-run policy alterna- 
tives along these lines and have calculated the projected costs and bene- 
fits of  each for workers of  different ages. The age cohorts, cohorts 1 
through 5, are ages twenty-five through thirty-four, thirty-five through 
forty-four, forty-five through fifty-four, fifty-five through sixty-four, and 
sixty-five and older, respectively. Those who are not yet  twenty-five 
constitute cohort X.  We have also calculated the implications of  these 
alternatives with regard to the social security surplus or  deficit to the year 
2050. Basically, for each alternative, we ask two questions. First, what is 
the ratio of  the present value of  benefits an age cohort can expect to 
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tions to social security? Second, what is the present value of the resulting 
social security retirement deficit through 2050? 








The Base Case analyzes the Social Security System as it  stands 
today.4 
The Trans alternative reduces benefits to eliminate transfers for 
cohorts 2-5. 
The Trans 80 alternative eliminates transfers and adjusts taxes in 
1980 to close the future deficit as of  1980. (Taxes were actually 
lowered by  1.5% of  income.) 
The Tax 80 alternative raises taxes by  1.7% of income beginning in 
1980 to close the future deficit as of  that year. 
The Tax 2030 alternative raises taxes by 3.9% of income beginning 
in 2030 to close the future deficit as of  that year. 
The Ret alternative increases retirement ages an average of  three 
years. 
Thus these alternatives allow us to determine the effects of decreasing 
benefits by  eliminating transfers, increasing taxes,  and increasing the 
retirement age. 
In  all of  these alternatives we  consider only the old age insurance 
portion of the Social Security System. Thus we exclude taxes and benefits 
paid for disability, health, and part of  survivor insurance. (The model 
does include the increased benefits paid to wives when their husbands 
die.)  We will  refer  to the retirement  insurance  system as OASI, to 
distinguish it from OASDHI, which includes health and disability insur- 
ance. 
In order to understand the basis of these calculations, it is important to 
consider the data on which they are based, the method of  analysis used, 
and the assumptions upon which they rely. 
7.5.1  Data 
The data used in the calculations are the 1975 Social Security Exact 
Match File that merges individual records from the 1973  Current Popula- 
tion Survey (CPS) with OASI earnings and benefit records. With these 
data, the pattern of actual OASI benefits, as well as lifetime contributions 
into the  system by  all individuals,  can be  found. These data permit 
redistribution across cohorts to be separated from the annuity aspects and 
enable us to estimate values for individual households. Since the data 
used include only a sample of  5,000 individuals in each cohort, sample 
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weights and  populations statistics are used  to generalize the sample 
results to the entire population. The weights are present in the file. 
The data actually used in the analysis from the social security longitu- 
dinal earnings tape include the sum of  covered earnings from 1937 to 
1950,  covered earnings from 1951  to 1975, estimated quarters of coverage 
from 1937 to 1950, and actual quarters of  coverage from 1951 to 1975. 
From the 1973 CPS, the following data were used: region, farm resi- 
dence, age, sex, race, marital status, class of worker, occupation, indus- 
try, weeks worked in 1972 as a civilian, industry of longest civilian job in 
1972, years of  school completed, and wage and salary amount. 
7.5.2  Method of  Analysis 
For cohorts 1-5  we determine the relation between the summation of 
aggregate contributions and the expected aggregate benefits of  all indi- 
viduals currently in the Social Security System, assuming in all cases but 
Ret that the retirement age is sixty-five for husbands and singles and that 
wives retire with their  husband^.^ For an individual, the value of  total 
contributions into the system at the point of retirement is the summation 
of  actual  and expected OASI taxes paid  both  by  himself  and by  his 
employer compounded by a real rate of  interest (3% in the base case). 
These calculations use actual and forecasted income, historical and fore- 
casted maximum taxable income limits, and historical and forecasted tax 
rates. 
The expected value of  OASI benefits over the worker’s remaining life 
is calculated considering the probability of  survival and the wage index 
from Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 1975.6  Wives 
receive benefits based on their own or  their husbands’ benefits, whichever 
is larger. The entire analysis is converted to 1977 dollars.’ 
In order to determine the expected contributions for individuals who 
5. A fraction of each cohort, those in noncovered industries or with insufficient quarters 
of coverage, are considered to be ineligible for benefits. Wives who do not qualify on their 
own or on their husbands’ behalf receive no benefits. The retirement pattern can also be 
simulated by a retirement behavior equation, but these initial estimates are used to compare 
them with typical Social Security Administration assumptions. 
6. The year of  death for each individual in cohorts 1-5  was predicted using a random 
number generator and his or her probability of  death at each age, conditional on race and 
sex. Individuals predicted to have died before reaching the age of sixty-five are excluded 
from the analysis of  average net benefits, although their taxes are included in the general 
financing calculations. For cohort X,  we used “average” men and women for each year-of- 
birth cohort, and reduced taxes and benefits in each year to account for the cumulative 
probability of  death. We used an average life expectancy assumption to find the number of 
years that a wife in cohort Xwill collect widow’s benefits. This assumption potentially adds a 
small bias in our  calculations. Year-of-death predictions used The U.  S. Fact Book (1978) for 
all ages less than sixty-five and ages sixty-five, seventy, and eighty. For ages not given, year 
of  death was predicted interpolating from the 1969-71  death rates in National Center for 
Health Statistics (1975). 
7. Benefits are increased by 17% for cohort 5  to adjust for the disproportionate number 
of  widows, whose social security entitlements are not captured by the data. 219  Modeling Alternative Solutions 
have not yet reached the age of  sixty-five, we applied the contribution 
rates specified in the 1977 amendments to the Social Security Act to 
known earnings and predicted future earnings for each individual. Earn- 
ings were predicted separately for males and females using an estimating 
equation based on positive 1972 earnings of all individuals in the sample. 
The predictions, determined from the estimated coefficients of  the inde- 
pendent  variables in the equation and the characteristics of  the indi- 
viduals, were indexed over time using 7% for inflationary earnings in- 
creases and the assumption of  a 1.5% per year earnings increase due to 
productivity for the Base Case.*  Female income is adjusted for labor force 
participation. 
More formally, we “age” our survey data so that we know both the past 
work history and the projected future work history and retirement bene- 
fits for the sample population. Having done this we calculate the present 
value of each household’s total contribution at retirement (PVC;). These 
are calculated as 
1  R 
I=  1  PVCR=  c cf 
(1 + r)R+  ’ 
where R is a given retirement age and r is the interest rate “credited” to a 
social security “account” under our pension plan analogue.’”  In fact, all 
projected contributions and benefits are calculated so that they are the 
anticipated dollar amount times the probability of  the individual surviv- 
ing to that time. 
We calculate the expected retirement  benefits at age of  retirement 
(PVBk)  as 
1  N 
PVBk=  2  Bi 
t=R  (1 + r)R -  ’ 
where N is 100, beyond which the survival probability is taken to be zero. 
Given that survival probabilities are already embedded in B,  and Ct,  an 
actuarially fair system would be one where PVCk = PVBk. We define 
8.  The actual dependent variable used was the log of  earnings. The independent vari- 
ables include dummy variables for  a southern location, rural location, race, the fact of being 
married, white collar status, service collar status, blue collar status,  employment  in an 
industry, self-employment, weeks worked, and level of  education. 
9.  Female labor force participation was assumed to keep the same age distribution as in 
1975, but to slowly increase for each age group until 2005. The rate increases 12.5 percent- 
age points for each age group by 2005. (This is based on assumptions of  the 1977Annual 
Reporr of  the  Trustees of rhe Social Security System.) Again, this is for comparison only. 
Future estimates will incorporate a separate female labor force participation equation. 
10. We make the usual assumption that the employer component is borne by employees, 
and hence include the employer part of  the payroll tax in estimating total contributions on 
behalf of  a worker. Alternative incidence assumptions could be used, and the data adjusted 
accordingly. The result, of course, would be to “credit” less tax payment and to increase the 
size of  transfers,  as the share of employer contributions assumed paid by someone other 
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the expected present value of any transfer received by the participant as 
The same type of  analysis is performed for cohort X,  which involves 
making several assumptions regarding the future.  '' 
After performing  the analysis  of  taxes  and  benefits  by  cohort for 
various scenarios, we sum the results in order to determine the budget 
surplus or deficit that results from each scenario. 
Tk = PVBk -  PVCk. 
7.6  An Overall Comparison of  Alternative Social Security Situations 
Let us  begin  by  examining some general  measures  of  the overall 
situation for the OASI system under alternative scenarios. In particular, 
we consider aggregate taxes, benefits, and the deficit under alternative 
social security situations and, correspondingly, the total transfers and 
transfers as a percentage of  income for alternative social security situa- 
tions. The situations to be discussed include the Base Case, i.e. current 
law, including currently legislated but not yet implemented tax increases; 
the Base Case with  a slightly lower rate of  productivity  growth; two 
situations in which the transfer component is eliminated and dealt with 
separately under general revenues, Trans 80 and Trans; and Ret, which 
increases the retirement age by three years. Table 7.1  presents estimates 
of  the aggregate taxes, benefits, and resulting present value of the long- 
term deficit under these alternative scenarios. Recall that we are making 
very conservative assumptions with respect to the projected long-term 
deficit in considering the Base Case in order to try to maintain compara- 
bility, roughly speaking, with the assumptions made by the trustees of the 
Social Security System. 
The Base Case is estimated assuming an annual rate of  productivity 
growth of  1.5% per year and an annual inflation rate of 7% per year, and 
the total taxes and benefit are discounted at a real rate of  3%  with all 
figures being presented in 1977 dollars. Thus, for the Base Case, we note 
that the total taxes amount to approximately $3.3 trillion whereas total 
11. The assumptions  are as follows:  (1) In terms of  cohort  size,  actual population 
statistics are used for individuals born from 1953 to 1977. Estimates of  size for 1978 to 2050 
were made assuming that birthrates would decline from 1.7 to 1.65 in 1980 and then slowly 
increase to 2.1 in 2005. (2) Female labor force participation is assumed to keep the same age 
profile as in 1975  but to slowly increase for each age group until 2005. The  rate increases 12.5 
percentage points for each group by 2005. (3) Coverage by the Social Security System is 
assumed constant at 90%. (4) The percentage of  women married is assumed constant at 
93% on the basis of  data from the  Statistical Abstract. (5) Unemployment  is assumed 
constant at 5%. (6) The mortality rates for each age group are assumed to remain constant. 
(7) Each couple is assumed to retire together at age sixty-five. (8) The wage is adjusted to 
account for the fact that all income used in the estimates is below the taxable limit since the 
wage equation and the Social Security Match Tape data are used. The adjustment is based 
on taxable/total  ratio in 1977. 
These assumptions are based on those of  the 1977Annual Report of  the Trustees of  the 
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Table 7.1  Aggregate Taxes, Benefits, and the 
kficit under Alternative Reforms 
Case  Total Taxes"  Total Benefits"  Deficit" 
Base  3,336.9  3,968.8  632.0 
Base with 
productivity = 1.0%  2,839.6  3,570.5  731.0 
Trans 80  2,798.6  2,656.5  -  142.1 
Trans  3,336.9  2,656.5  -680.3 
Ret  3,500.9  3,345.6  -  155.3 
"All  figures are in billions of  discounted  1977 dollars. 
benefits amount to about $4 trillion. Again, recall that these figures are 
adjusted for inflation and discounted to 1977. With these assumptions, 
the estimated long-term deficit amounts to $632 billion. Recall that this 
does not include the hospital and disability insurance programs, in which 
case taxes, benefits, and the deficit would all be substantially larger. This 
enormous deficit occurs primarily because of the changing age structure 
of the  population, as noted above. When the baby boom generation starts 
to retire, we face the awkward prospect of  an extremely large and rapid 
increase in the ratio of  retirees to workers in our society. Even if  the 
actuarial assumptions of  the social security trustees are accurate-and  we 
believe they are optimistic-we  will have to raise social security taxes or 
lower social security benefits, or raise other tax revenues, or some com- 
bination of  these options, by an enormous amount in the years ahead. 
This combination  would  have  to  amount  to $632 billion  (discounted 
dollars) in 1977; if we wait for the baby boom generation to retire around 
the year 2030, the combination necessary will be between $2.5 and $3 
trillion in 1977 dollars. 
The estimated taxes, benefits, and deficit for the Base Case are very 
sensitive to the assumptions incorporated in making projections over the 
long term. Because of the importance of compounding even small differ- 
ences in growth rates, even so small a difference as one-half of  1%  in the 
rate of productivity growth increases the  long-term deficit-holding  other 
assumptions constant-by  almost  $100 billion  in present value terms. 
Table 7.1  demonstrates  that, when the productivity growth assumption is 
lowered from 1.5% to 1% per annum, the Base Case results in a de- 
creased tax revenue, again in present value discounted dollars of  almost 
$500 billion to $2.8 trillion, and a reduction in total benefits by about $400 
billion from slightly under $4 trillion to slightly under $3.6 trillion. The 
recent behavior of productivity does not give us much cause for optimism 
for restoring a rapid rate of  economic growth in our economy and does 
not augur well for the long-term deficit of  social security. 
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taxes, benefits,  and the deficit concerns the length of  retirement.  As 
noted above, early forecasts drastically underestimated how rapidly life 
expectancies would increase. In the 1960s and 1970s, the life expectancy 
increased about three years for women and one and one-half years for 
men. Simultaneously, there has been a rapid acceleration in the numbers 
of  pepple taking early retirement. In 1948, one-half of  males over age 
sixty-five were in the labor force; in 1980, only one-fifth of  males over 
sixty-five are working. If  life expectancy rises still further, the long-term 
deficit in social security will increase drastically. As a rough approxima- 
tion, increasing life expectancy and eligibility for  social security benefits by 
an extra year would add about $250 billion to the long-term deficit. In view 
of the increased length of  retirement periods (because of  increased life 
expectancy and earlier retirement) and in view of  the higher fraction of 
the population attending college and hence which is entering the labor 
force later and is shifting out of  physically demanding and dangerous 
jobs, one major avenue of reform of social security would be to raise the 
age at which people could collect social security benefits. We simulated 
one such scenario: raising the retirement age from sixty-five to sixty- 
eight, or, more precisely, adding a maximum of three years to work-lives 
(which is obviously relevant only to those who survive to those ages). 
Under the assumptions of  the Base Case for productivity growth, infla- 
tion, etc., such a move would result in a very modest increase in taxes 
from the additional years of work (about $170 billion) but would result in 
a $620 billion benefit decrease. Note that this  would be accomplished 
without decreasing the annual benefit received by any worker once retired. 
The reduction in total benefits in discounted 1977 dollars would come 
about solely because people would be retiring later and hence would be 
collecting benefits for a shorter period of  time. Such a reduction would 
more than offset the impending enormous social security deficit and the 
impending enormous tax increases that would be necessary under the 
current system above and beyond those already voted. Indeed, such a 
program in conjunction with the other assumptions noted above would 
leave social security with a surplus of  over $150 billion. An alternative 
scenario, raising the retirement age less rapidly and not quite as high, 
could still put the Social Security System into long-term balance. This 
scenario highlights the extreme importance of  the length of  the retire- 
ment period for the total benefits paid out and the long-term deficit of the 
system. 
The  long-term  benefit  payouts  and  tax  collections,  especially the 
former,  are also extremely  sensitive to the enormous percentage of 
transfer payments involved in social security benefits, especially for older 
current workers and retirees.  Two other scenarios were simulated to 
analyze the removal of  positive transfer payments: Trans and Trans 80. 
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pletely for cohorts 2-5.  The negative transfers for cohorts 1 and X  are 
maintained. The transfers are assumed to be shifted to general revenues 
in a manner to be decided once a genuine earned entitlement system is set 
up. We must note, however, that setting up a transfer payment system for 
the elderly to be funded out of  general revenues may involve either 
increases in general revenue taxes or decreases in other projected govern- 
ment expenditures as well as the sharp reductions in payroll taxes and 
projected future payroll tax increases we are about to describe. Also, part 
of  the reduced payroll  tax revenue  (about 20%) would be  recouped 
automatically by increased taxes once the employer component of social 
security used to finance these transfers was no longer deductible from 
taxable income for other taxes. Under Trans, taxes will not go down at 
all, but total benefits will go down about one-third, from slightly under $4 
trillion to about $2.7 trillion. This totally reverses the deficit picture from 
a two-thirds of  a trillion dollar deficit to a two-thirds of  a trillion dollar 
surplus discounted to 1977. Besides totally eliminating the need for future 
tax increases, the two-thirds of  a trillion dollar surplus obviously could 
result in further deductions in social security taxes from present levels. It 
could also be used to finance transfer payments if  we shifted total trans- 
fers into general revenue. 
The Trans 80 alternative substantially reduces taxes as well as total 
benefits. Indeed, the total benefits would be treated exactly as under 
Trans. The difference is that tax revenues would be reduced substantially 
from 1980 on, leaving social security itself with a very modest surplus of 
$140 billion. 
This overall version of the total situation with respect to taxes, benefits, 
and the long-term deficit highlights not only the current extreme long- 
term deficit of  the Social Security System as presently constituted, and 
the large tax increases above and beyond the 1977 legislated ones im- 
pending in view of  the long-term deficit, but also the opportunities and 
possibilities for deriving a solution by  separating the benefits paid to 
achieve the twin goals of social security: earned entitlement and income 
adequacy during retirement. It also highlights the extreme sensitivity of 
the long-term deficit, benefit payments, and tax receipts to such things as 
slower productivity growth and changes in the length of  the retirement 
period. We might conclude this brief discussion by noting that the long- 
term future of social security is not something to  be left to the long term to 
deal with. Every year we postpone dealing with the problem gives us one 
less year to generate a smooth transition to a more rational and cost- 
effective system of  providing adequate income support for our elderly 
population. 
To analyze the transfer component involved in social security at the 
aggregate level in a little more detail, we present in table 7.2  estimates of 
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Table 7.2  Total Transfers and Transfers as Percent 
of Income under Alternative Reforms 
Case 
Total Transfers 
to Cohorts 2-5"  National Income 
Transfers as % of 
Base  1,818.8  4.7% 
Base with 
productivity  = 1.0%  1,746.3  5.3 
Trans 80  72.3  .2 
Trans  0  0 
Ret  1,542.0  3.8 
"All  figures are in billions of  discounted  1977 dollars. 
under the same scenarios discussed above in conjunction with table 7.1. 
We estimate here that the total transfers to cohorts 2-5.  For the Base 
Case under the standard (if  optimistic) assumptions, total transfers to 
cohorts 2-5  would be $1.8 trillion and amount to slightly under 5% of 
total national income! Placed in perspective, this is only slightly less than 
the share of income being devoted to defense expenditures. Some of the 
transfers to cohort 5 have been paid; the estimated remaining transfers 
amount to $1.3 trillion.I2 Under the standard assumptions of  the Base 
Case with our slightly lower rate of productivity growth, transfers decline 
slightly to $1.75 trillion but increase the percentage of  the now smaller 
income (arising from the lower productivity growth) to slightly over 5%. 
Obviously, under the Trans alternative total transfers have been elimi- 
nated completely and hence are zero in both the total and as a percentage 
of income; the Trans 80 alternative allows transfers to be paid for several 
additional years before taxes are adjusted (remember we start from a 
base year of 1977,  since that is when our data end), and transfers would be 
virtually abolished in this case. Finally, we note that the increase in the 
retirement age for all cohorts after cohort 5  would substantially reduce 
transfer payments by about $275 billion to cohorts 2-5  and reduce trans- 
fers as a percentage of national income by approximately 1  percentage 
point. These enormous amounts for total transfers to cohorts 2-5  reveal 
that fundamental changes in social security toward separating the transfer 
and annuity goals of the program would allow major changes in the social 
security tax structure. 
7.7  Detailed Results for the Base Case 
In order to present disaggregated figures concerning the benefits re- 
ceived, taxes paid, and transfers received by the average family of differ- 
12. John Wolfe and Joseph Applebaum kindly pointed out our failure to separate out 
transfers already paid to retirees (from those remaining to be paid) in the earlier versions of 
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ent age and income, we will focus on the Base Case assumptions. Recall 
from  the discussion above, however, that  these  assumptions may  be 
somewhat optimistic and that slower productivity growth or increased 
retirement periods would add substantially to the taxes necessary to 
finance “promised” benefits. The Base Case simply ignores the long-term 
deficit and assumes that, despite the enormous long-term deficit, current 
workers will not be forced to pay any tax increases above and beyond 
those already legislated. Were part of the solution to the long-term deficit 
to gradually raise taxes above and beyond those increases already legis- 
lated, as discussed in the next section, current workers would have to 
bear substantially more of the burden than under the Base Case; indeed, 
younger workers would lose substantially with respect to social security. 
Under the Base Case, assuming that taxes would not be raised until the 
baby boom generation retires or later, almost all current workers come 
out fairly well in terms of  their average net benefits above and beyond 
taxes paid plus interest, but workers under the age of  twenty-five will 
ultimately be forced to finance such benefits. 
Table 7.3 analyzes the Base Case for six different age cohorts: for 
current retirees (for simplicity, persons over sixty-five);  for ten-year age 
groups (twenty-five through thirty-four, thirty-five through forty-four, 
forty-five through fifty-four, and fifty-five through sixty-four); and for 
cohort X,  persons under the age of twenty-five. (Family age is defined as 
the age of the husband.) The situation of  a family of each age category is 
depicted in terms of the average tax paid per family, the average benefit 
received per family (the difference between benefits and taxes), and the 
Table 7.3  Base Case 
Cohort 5  Cohort 4  Cohort 3  Cohort 2  Cohort 1  Cohort X 
(65+)  (64-55)  (54-45)  (44-35)  (34-25)  (<25) 
Average tax 
per family  $7,058  18,345  33,883  53,326  73,843 
Average benefit 
per family  $49,400  47,639  56,600  66,321  73,577 
Average net benefit 
per family  $42,343  29,294  22,718  12,994  -267 
Average net benefit 
as % tax per family  600.0  160.0  67.0  24.4  -.36 
Total taxes paid 
by cohort (billions)  $172  235  349  389  540  1,500+ 
Total benefits paid 
to cohort (billions)  $1,282  629  570  483  503 
Transfers as % of 
total benefits  86.6  62.7  38.8  19.4  -7.39 
Notes:  Assumes 7% inflation, 1.5% productivity growth, 3% discount. For eligible survi- 
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average net benefit as a percentage of  the taxes the family paid. Also 
tabulated are the total taxes paid by the cohort and the total benefits paid 
to  the cohort when they ultimately retire under current estimates, as well 
as the transfers as a percentage of  total benefits received by the cohort 
when they ultimately retire. 
There are a variety of  important points illustrated by  the Base Case. 
First, the average tax per family, adjusted for inflation and discounted to 
the husband’s year of retirement, will increase markedly as time goes by 
and hence is much higher for younger workers than older workers or 
current retirees. This occurs for a number of reasons: some of the retirees 
will not have paid taxes through their entire lives; the tax rates actually 
paid and taxable ceiling used for each year have been growing through 
time and hence the annual taxes paid have been growing through time 
and will continue under current law. The average tax paid in 1977 dollars 
adjusted for inflation will be  10 times as high for twenty-five through 
thirty-four year olds as for people currently retired. 
Benefit payments increase much less rapidly through time; hence, as 
we get to younger ages, net transfers become negative. Current retirees 
and persons soon to retire will receive benefits based not so much on what 
they paid in taxes but on an estimate of what the current tax revenue will 
support. Since current tax revenues are levied at a higher rate and on a 
larger income base than were taxes collected from the current retirees 
and those soon to be retired, their benefits are obviously much higher 
than the taxes paid plus interest. Therefore twenty-five through thirty- 
four year olds will receive only about one-half again as much in the real 
1977 value of  benefits once they retire as do current beneficiaries (those 
sixty-five  and  older).  Again,  recall  the  Base  Case  ignores  possible 
changes in  life expectancies or retirement patterns.  Differencing the 
benefits and taxes reveals the very large net benefits, or transfers, re- 
ceived by current retirees and those about to retire. The average current 
retiree receives about $42,000 as a net transfer from the taxes paid to the 
Social Security System by current workers. This amounts to 6 times what 
these people on average paid plus interest. An average family in the next 
cohort, the fifty-five through sixty-four year olds, will receive back as a 
transfer payment  1.6 times what they paid in plus interest, a total of 
slightly over $30,000. The average net benefit, or transfer, declines for 
progressively younger  ages both  in  absolute amounts and still more 
rapidly as a percentage of  tax paid per family, since the latter will rise 
rapidly. By the time we get to younger workers (ages twenty-five through 
thirty-four),  they  are actually losing in  terms of  the taxes paid  plus 
interest being less than the average benefits they can expect to receive. 
Persons under the age of  twenty-five will suffer a loss under the current 
calculation. Because of  the untenable state of  the long-run deficit, the 
current calculation is unrealistic for this young cohort and their actual loss 
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by each cohort follow the obvious pattern: taxes rise substantially as we 
pass through time. Again, these tax amounts do  not include any increases 
that must be voted if  we are to close the long-run deficit by  increasing 
taxes rather than decreasing benefits or by adopting one of the structural 
reforms suggested below.  Transfers as a percentage of  total benefits 
follow a pattern similar to those for the average family. The overwhelm- 
ing bulk of benefits are transfers for current retirees; for the next cohort 
about 60%  will be transfers; for the forty-five through fifty-four age 
cohort  slightly under 40%  will  be transfers; transfers  will  eventually 
vanish and become negative as we reach the younger cohorts. Obviously, 
for ages under twenty-five there will be a large negative transfer. Also, 
the transfers as a percentage of  total benefits will decrease for all age 
cohorts not currently retired if  we start to raise taxes now in anticipation 
of  closing the deficit. The time pattern of  such tax increases will  be 
reflected in differential rates of reduction of the transfers as a percentage 
of  total benefits for the different age groups. In the extreme, if  we wait 
until the baby boom generation retires, transfers as a percentage of total 
benefits will be an extremely large negative number for those currently 
under the age of  twenty-five. 
Table 7.4 takes a deeper look at the net transfers from social security 
Table 7.4  Net Transfers by Income Class 
Income Class” 
























































Note:  Base Case with inflation = 770, productivity = 1.5%, discount rate = 3% net of 
inflation. 
bNet benefits = benefits for average family in income class, where both survive to retire- 
ment, in 1977 dollars, discounted to year of  retirement, less taxes paid computed analo- 
‘%  break  = net benefits  t benefits paid. 
1977 dollars, for head of  household only. 
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received by individuals in the different cohorts. We examine net benefits 
received and the percentage break (net benefits divided by total benefits) 
for four different  income classes. For  each cohort, we note that the 
percentage break declines rapidly as income increases. For example, for 
the cohort twenty-five through thirty-four years old the percentage break 
goes from slightly over 8% for families with incomes under $6,000 to 
-  2.5% for families with incomes above $10,800. Again, for cohort 5,  the 
current retirees, the percentage break declines from 87.6% to 75.3% as 
we  move up the income scale. This particular feature of  the relation 
between the percentage break and income reflects primarily the progres- 
sivity of  the benefit payment  formula, which is tilted heavily toward 
replacing a larger fraction of preretirement income for low-income  work- 
ers than for higher-income workers. Of course, the total net benefits may 
be slightly larger for some cohorts for higher-income people, reflecting 
the interaction of the larger intergenerational transfer and the larger tax 
payment which higher-income individuals make. 
Finally, in examining the Base Case, we take a look at one other type of 
transfer as a percentage of  benefits paid: disaggregating by industry of 
employment (table 7.5). Transfers as a percentage of  benefits paid vary 
substantially  across industries for a number of  reasons:  the different 
average income earned by  workers of  different industries, the slightly 
different tax treatment in effective payroll tax rates because of differen- 
tial proportions of workers above and below the taxable ceiling, etc. It is 
important to note that once again the substantial net transfer to current 
retirees and expected net transfers to the oldest cohorts of workers will 
turn  negative  for the youngest cohorts. These negative transfers will 
Table 7.5  Transfers as Percent of Benefits Paid 
for Selected Industries by  Cohort 
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occur  even  without  considering  the large  tax  increases necessary to 
finance the impending long-run deficit. 
With these insights into the current social security situation in mind, we 
turn to a brief discussion of  the alternative scenarios mentioned above. 
7.8  Disaggregated Estimates for Alternative Reform Possibilities 
We have calculated, for a series of  potential benefit and tax reforms, 
disaggregated estimates of average taxes per family, average benefits per 
family, average net benefits per family, average net benefits as a percent- 
age of  taxes per family, total taxes paid and benefits received by each 
cohort, and transfers as a percentage of  total benefits for each cohort. 
The first alternative considered is that labeled “Trans” (see table 7.6). 
Recall that this eliminates all transfers  to cohorts 2-5  and sets up a 
situation where  transfers would  be  treated  separately under  general 
revenues if  so desired. In this scenario, we note the familiar pattern of the 
average taxes paid per family rising substantially as we move to younger 
and younger cohorts. We note the same pattern for average benefits. 
However, now a different pattern emerges for the average net benefits 
received per family. In this case the average net benefits are virtually zero 
for all age cohorts. They differ slightly because we have not constrained 
the transfer to be zero for each cohort in each case, but have reduced the 
aggregate benefit payout each year to eliminate the transfer. Once again, 
the total taxes paid and total benefits received by each cohort increase 
Table 7.6  Trans 
Cohort as of  1977 
5  4  3  2  1  X 
Average tax 
per familya  7,058  18,345  33,882  53,326  73,843 
Average benefit 
per family”  6,629  17,793  34,769  53,461  73,576 
Average net benefit 
per family”  -429  -552  886  134.9  -267 
Average net benefit 
as % tax per family  -6.07  -3.01  2.62  .25  -.36 
Total taxes paid 
by  cohort (billions)”  172.1  235.0  349.4  389.0  539.6  1,500+ 
Total benefits paid 
to cohort (billions)”  172.1  235.0  350.4  389.0  502.5 
Transfers as % of 
total benefits  .01  -.01  .29  0  -  7.39 
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Table 7.1  Trans 80 
Cohort as of  1977 
5  4  3  2  1  X 
Average tax 
per family"  7,045  17,818  31,368  47,729  64,409 
Average benefit 
per family"  6,629  17,793  34,770  53,461  73,577 
Average net benefit 
per family"  -415  -24.6  3,401  5,732  9,168 
Average net benefit 
as % tax per family  -5.89  -  .14  10.84  12.0  14.23 
Total taxes paid 
by cohort (billions)"  171.6  228.8  324.6  349.0  470.0 
Total benefits paid 
to cohort (billions)"  172.1  234.9  350.4  389.0  502.5 
Transfers as % of 
total benefits  .25  2.60  7.36  10.28  6.46 
"In 1977 dollars 
substantially as we go to younger and younger cohorts and net to approx- 
imately zero in the aggregate for each cohort. 
Moving from Trans to Trans 80 (table 7.7),  which you recall involves a 
tax cut as well as eliminating the transfers, yields a very similar pattern to 
that  discussed above for Trans; indeed, the benefits received by  the 
average family in each cohort are identical to the situation under Trans, 
as are the total benefits paid out to each cohort. However, now the taxes 
differ somewhat to take account of  the modest surplus that would result 
by eliminating all the transfers. In this case the average taxes per family 
are somewhat lower for each cohort, decreasing progressively more in 
percentage terms for younger and younger age cohorts. The total taxes 
paid per cohort follow the same pattern. 
Table 7.8 presents the same analysis under the Base Case assumptions 
for the scenario we label "Ret"  to indicate retirement ages raised by three 
years on average. As noted before, Ret results in a situation in which 
slightly higher taxes will be paid by the younger cohorts because they will 
be working slightly longer, and the benefits received, while maintainable 
at the same annual level, will be  paid  out over  a somewhat shorter 
period.I3 Therefore the aggregate benefits and the average benefits will 
decline relative to the Base Case; we present estimates of  benefits dis- 
counted to the original retirement age and note the decline in absolute 
13. A Ret-type reform could be phased in: The retirement  age could be increased to 
sixty-seven or sixty-eight gradually, before the baby boom generation reaches retirement 
age, by delaying the age of eligibility for benefits a month per year, for example. This would 
avoid problems of  changing the rules abruptly for those soon to retire or just retired. 231  Modeling Alternative Solutions 
Table 7.8  Ret 
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Note: Values listed here are conditional on  our standard assumption of  the continuation of 
current life expectancies. 
"In 1977 dollars. 
and percentage terms. For example, the twenty-five through thirty-four 
year old cohort loses about $9,500, or 13% of  average family benefits 
relative to the Base Case estimates presented in table 7.3. Remember, 
however, that the benefits calculated in  the Ret scenario are feasible 
because the long-term funding deficit has been closed. The Base Case 
benefit calculations ignore the funding problem and hence are notfeasible 
without tax changes. We note again that the average net benefit per 
family declines with age from $38,000 for current retirees to virtually zero 
for people now forty to a large negative number for people now around 
the age of thirty. The same is obviously true of  average net benefits as a 
percentage of taxes per family. We note, however, that the total benefits 
received by each cohort will decline substantially with the later retire- 
ment.  This  decline  becomes  progressively  more  important  as  we 
approach  younger  age cohorts  and  reflects the importance of  doing 
something about the long-term deficit as soon as possible, before enor- 
mous  implicit  obligations,  which  are  currently  unfunded,  become 
cemented in place and we are forced to go to enormous tax increases to 
fund them. 
This point is vividly documented by comparing Ret with the two tax 
scenarios: Tax 80, a small tax increase now (above those already legis- 
lated to take effect in the future), which will totally close the deficit; and 
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Table 7.9  Tax 80 
Cohort as of  1977 
5  4  3  2  1 
Average tax 
per family"  7,074  18,966  36,839  59,907  84,935 
Average benefit 
per family"  49,400  47,640  56,600  63,321  73,576 
Average net benefit 
Average net benefit 
Total taxes paid 
by cohort (billions)"  172  237  378  440  605 
Total benefits paid 
to cohort (billions)".b  1,297  614  592  485  516 
Transfers as % of 
per family"  42,327  28,674  19,761  6,414  -  11,358 
as % tax per family  598.3  151.2  53.64  10.71  -  13.37 
total benefits  87  61  36  9  -  17 
"In  1977 dollars. 
bThese  values differ slightly from the Base Case because a smaller sample size was used in 
this calculation. 
retirement in the year 2030. Estimates for the latter two alternatives are 
contained in tables 7.9 and 7.10, respectively. Recall that these refer to 
the increases necessary to cover the OASI deficit only; the Disability 
Insurance and Health Insurance deficits would add considerably to the 
totals. The average tax paid and average benefit received per family look 
rather similar to the Ret case; the average net benefits differ somewhat. 
What  is  most  important is  the  large  difference in  the total  benefits 
received by each cohort as part of the Social Security System and the total 
social security taxes paid for each cohort. Under Trans, Trans 80, or Ret, 
the benefits are reduced in the Social Security System either directly or 
indirectly, and the total benefits paid to each cohort are much lower than 
if  the implicit unfunded obligation involved is paid. The total benefits 
paid to younger cohorts differ enormously under the Tax 80 and Tax 2030 
programs, as do the taxes paid. For example, while the total benefits paid 
to each cohort are identical under Tax 80 and Tax 2030, the time patterns 
and hence aggregate amounts of  taxes paid by  each age cohort differ 
substantially. The aggregate taxes paid by current retirees and by workers 
aged fifty-five through sixty-four are virtually identical under these two 
scenarios. By the time we get to the thirty-five through forty-four year 
olds, Tax 80 has this cohort paying $50 billion more in social security taxes 
than if  we wait until after they retire to raise the tax rates in order to 
finance the unfunded deficit. For those aged twenty-five through thirty- 
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Table 7.10  Tax 2030 
Cohort as of  1977 
5  4  3  2  1 
Average tax 
per family"  7,058  18,346  33,883  53,326  73,843 
Average benefit 
per family"  49,401  47,640  56,600  66,321  73,576 
Average net benefit 
Average net benefit 
Total taxes paid 
by cohort (billions)"  167  230  349  393  526 
Total benefits paid 
to  cohort  1,297  614  592  486  516 
Transfers as % of 
total benefits  87  63  41  19  -2 
per family"  42,343  29,294  22,717  12,994  -  267 
as  % tax per family  600  159.68  67.05  24.37  -  .36 
'In  1977 dollars. 
These values differ slightly from the Base Case because a smaller sample size was used in 
this calculation. 
of  chosing a time frame for dealing with the long-term funding problems 
of  social security. Chosing to do nothing about this implies that we are 
trying to stick younger and younger generations with the  bill. Will they be 
willing to finance future retirement payments at much higher tax rates 
than now exist? 
In summary, we may note the variety of potential strategies for disen- 
tangling the severe problems that high and rising social security taxes and 
dual-purpose unrationalized benefits create. We can simply say that we 
are going to raise taxes by substantially more than those legislated in the 
1977 amendments either currently (Tax 80) or in the distant future (Tax 
2030), and try to shift around the burden of  paying for these increased 
social security benefits, which are not currently funded, or we can try to 
rationalize the benefit payments by separating out the transfer and annu- 
ity goals of the system, strengthening the earned entitlement function and 
having a separate transfer payment program funded by general revenues 
at whatever level is deemed socially desirable. The latter alternatives 
exist under Trans and Trans 80, and are easily combined with a slight 
increase in the retirement age as in Ret. These different scenarios suggest 
not only that there will be an enormous long-run impact on our overall 
economy depending  upon which of  these types of avenues we pursue, but 
that different groups in the population will be taxed and benefited quite 
differently depending upon which of  these alternatives we select. It is 
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benefit structure and relieve the long-run burden of  the much higher 
payroll taxes implicit in the unfunded deficit. This paper is the first of our 
social security simulation model projections. Subsequent work will deal 
with other issues (e.g. alternative indexing possibilities). We hope to 
stimulate discussion as well as provide some quantitative estimates of the 
taxes, benefits, and deficit implied by  alternative potential solutions to 
the long-run social security funding problems. 
7.9  Further Work Completed 
Since the original version of this paper was written, the Social Security 
Administration 1980 trustees’ annual report was issued with considerably 
altered  assumptions  in their  intermediate  and pessimistic Base  Case 
scenarios. Therefore we have recalculated a variety of the aggregate tax, 
benefit, and deficit totals, and discounted them back to 1980 under the 
assumptions used by  the Social Security Administration  1980 trustees’ 
annual report. These results are summarized in table 7.11. In all cases, 
“intermediate” refers to the intermediate assumptions of the trustees and 
“pessimistic” refers to the pessimistic assumptions of  the trustees. The 
major differences between the 1980 assumptions and those made pre- 
viously are a slower rate of  productivity growth, higher inflation in the 
pessimistic case, lower fertility rates, higher unemployment in the short 
term, and a lower discount rate. 
The  general nature of the results conforms closely with those reported 
earlier in our paper-obviously,  however, updated to 1980 from 1977 
dollars. For example, the intermediate base projection reveals a deficit of 
slightly under  $1 trillion in  the social security retirement system; the 
pessimistic assumptions reveal a real 1980 deficit of almost $1.5 trillion. 
Because the Social Security Administration trustees have chosen to use 
lower discount rates in reporting results in their  1980 report, we also 
present in rows 3 and 4 the same estimates using our earlier 3% real 
discount  rate; this reduces the present  values of  the deficit to about 
two-thirds of those just reported. The other major findings remain qual- 
itatively unchanged: Raising the retirement  age to sixty-eight runs a 
modest surplus under the intermediate assumptions and nearly elimi- 
nates the deficit under the pessimistic one. Eliminating the transfers runs 
large surpluses, but such a scenario, of  course, would have to be sup- 
plemented  by  an expanded income security program  for the elderly, 
which would probably more than make up for the difference. Raising 
taxes  in  1980 or in  2030  to  close the  deficit over  the entire  period 
1980-2050 would require, in the four cases considered, tax rate increases 
above  and beyond  those  already  legislated of  1.6 and 2.4%, in  the 
intermediate and pessimistic scenarios beginning in 1980; and 7% and 
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Table 7.11  Aggregate Taxes, Benefits, and 
the Deficit under Alternative Reforms 
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Note:  All figures are in billions of  discounted 1980 dollars. 
As can be seen, the assumptions of  the Social Security Administration 
trustees are becoming slightly more pessimistic, and hence the problems 
discussed in this paper are, if  anything, becoming more and more acute. 
7.10  Induced Retirement 
All the estimates made thus far conform in their assumptions to those 
usually made by the Social Security Administration trustees, for exam- 
ple, those that pertain to labor force participation, retirement behavior, 
etc. It is possible, and indeed in some cases desirable, to build behavioral 
simulations into the model that will account for econometric evidence on 
these decisions. Since the real level of social security benefits is scheduled 
to increase substantially as time goes on through the use of  wage, as 
opposed to price, indexing of the formula calculating the initial benefits, 
any response of  retirement behavior to increases in real social security 
benefits should be taken into account in analyses of  the type performed 
above. As a first step in this direction, we have overridden the Social 
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ment probability equations taken from Hurd and Boskin (1981). These 
retirement probability equations were estimated from data which merged 
the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey with social security earnings 
histories. The reader is referred to that paper for a detailed discussion of 
the estimates. The only point we wish to make here is that in that paper 
substantial evidence is presented for the hypothesis that increases in the 
real level of social security benefits increase the probability of retirement 
for persons aged sixty to sixty-five. Using the elasticity of estimates of the 
probability of  retirement in combination with the scheduled increases in 
real social security benefits, we have made some calculations about the 
reduction  in  working years that will  probably result  from the Social 
Security benefit increases and therefore about the decreases in tax rev- 
enue and increases  in  benefit payments  that  might ensue. We  have 
arrived at the following estimates of  the deficit including the Hurd and 
Boskin (1981) induced retirement response (in 1980 dollars): 
Intermediate assumptions  $1,051 billion 
Pessimistic assumptions  $1,688 billion 
We predict that, in the period 1980-2050, 116 million fewer person years 
will be worked, an average decline of  1.5 work years between the ages of 
sixty and sixty-five for a male who becomes sixty in the year 2030. The 
weighted average elasticity of the annual probability of retirement during 
these age intervals, given that people had not retired previously with 
respect to real social security wealth (the real present value of  expected 
social security benefits) is slightly over 1. As can be seen from the figures 
above, the deficit increases by approximately 14% in both the intermedi- 
ate and pessimistic cases. 
While these are not enormous figures, it is clear that substantial in- 
creases in social security benefits can lead to substantially earlier retire- 
ment, and our figures should really be taken as a lower bound, since they 
truncate at age sixty. There could also be an induced retirement at still 
earlier ages, which we have not taken into account. 
Our conclusion is simply that behavioral responses for a variety of 
types of behavior, especially retirement, induced by changes in the social 
security  law,  or by  intergenerational  transfers  which  are  not  offset 
through private means, may well be important enough to include in 
analyses of  social security reform proposals.  Certainly, ignoring such 
induced retirement effects appears to lead to a nontrivial underestimate 
of  the deficit. 
Further work, on both retirement and other behavioral decisions, will 
enrich the model considerably and will be the subject of future research. 237  Modeling Alternative Solutions 
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Comment  Henry Aaron 
The paper by Boskin, Avrin, and Cone contains three distinct themes. 
First, it provides estimates of the aggregate long-run deficit and examines 
particular modifications in the structure of  social security that would, 
among other things, close the long-run deficit in the system. Second, it 
simulates how the social security system affects workers belonging to 
different cohorts and with  different  earnings.  Third, it simulates the 
distributional differences among various methods of correcting the long- 
run deficit in the social security system. In all cases the paper focuses on 
the long-term financial condition of  the system; it wholly lays short-run 
issues to the side. So shall I. 
In my comments I shall try to show that the paper does an admirable 
job  of  revealing  the  large  differences  in  how  the various  proposed 
changes to the current system will affect different cohorts, but that it does 
not deal satisfactorily with the first two issues. 
Background 
I begin my comments with a description of  the elements of the social 
security system, knowledge of which is necessary for reading this paper. 
The system is financially self-contained. Revenues come from a pro- 
portional tax on  earnings below a legislated maximum in covered employ- 
ment. With the exception of three recent ad hoc adjustments, this max- 
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imum rises at the same rate as do money earnings. The benefit structure is 
progressive-in  the sense that the elasticity of  benefits with respect to 
average earnings at each point in time is less than 1. 
As under defined-benefit pensions, workers employed during a period 
when the system is being liberalized are the beneficiaries of “past service 
credits” (the Social Security Administration term) or “immaturity ben- 
efits” (my term). Roskin, Avrin, and Cone use the term “transfer ben- 
efits” to denote any benefits greater than those that could be paid from 
the accumulation of employee and employer taxes compounded at a real 
interest rate of 3%. When one is looking at cohorts of  workers, transfer 
benefits  are equal  to the past  service credits or immaturity  benefits 
enjoyed  by  that cohort. When  one is looking at particular  workers, 
transfer benefits include not only immaturity benefits but also additions 
to or subtractions from benefits attributable to the progressive benefit 
formula. 
The use of  the single term “transfer benefits” confuses two distinct 
analytical and policy questions regarding social security: what to do  about 
the debt resulting  from  the payment  of  past  service credits  to past, 
present, and future social security beneficiaries, and what to do about the 
“tilt,” or degree of progressivity, in the social security benefit formula. I 
believe that this confusion, in the end, detracts from the relevance of  the 
paper to debates about how social security should be changed. 
In addition to having a progressive benefit formula and awarding past 
service credits,  social security  also  bases  benefits on family  circum- 
stances. Extra benefits are paid to certain relatives of entitled decedent, 
retired, or disabled workers. 
The social security system will be in surplus for the next twenty-five 
years (counting from 1980), balance for the next fifty years, and deficit for 
the seventy-five year planning horizon which Congress has stipulated for 
social security.’ Over the next twenty-five years, according to the latest 
estimates of  the actuaries, the social security system (OASDI) will be in 
surplus by 1.27% of payroll against an average cost of  10.67% of payroll, 
a surplus of  11.9% of  cost. Over the next fifty years, the social security 
system will be in surplus by a smaller amount. Over the seventy-five  year 
horizon, the deficit is 0.93% of  payroll or 7.1% of  the average cost of  . 
13.17%; this deficit clearly is confined during the third twenty-five year 
period, running from 2030 to 2054, during which time the deficit is 3.39% 
of  payroll on an average cost of  15.79%, for a deficit of  21.5%.* 
1. The authors correctly disregard the short-term financial problems of  social security, 
because the issues are quite unrelated to the long-term issues. 
2. The social security trustees, operating on the premise that if  projections based on 
three sets of  assumptions (the practice before 1981) are useful, projections based on five 
should be marvelous (the practice in the 1981 trustees’ reports), have provided a confusing 
array of  alternative projections.  The text estimates are projections 11-A from the 1981 239  Modeling Alternative Solutions 
What the Authors Do 
Boskin, Arvin, and Cone take as their starting point  the fact that 
currently legislated payroll taxes are insufficient to pay for currently 
legislated social security benefits throughout the seventy-five  year period 
over which Congress has determined that the calculations of  financial 
soundness of  the social security system shall be evaluated. According to 
estimates described below, the present value of  this deficit is large: $632 
billion. The authors note that this deficit can be eliminated by  benefit 
reductions or by increases in taxes dedicated to social security. The bulk 
of the paper consists of  an analysis of the effects on several cohorts of five 
possible legislative changes in benefits and taxes. The authors calculate 
the expected present  value of  taxes and benefits for each of  six age 
cohorts. They use a 3% real interest rate and assume that real wages grow 
1.5% per year.3 
The technique of  the simulation is as follows. The authors generate 
earnings histories for workers of  different ages based historically on the 
1975 Exact  Match  between  social security  records  and  the  Current 
Population  Survey  and  prospectively  from  wage  regressions.  The 
methods used in estimating future wages are not clearly presented and 
could not be even approximated from the description contained in the 
paper. 
Then the authors say that they calculate the payroll taxes that would be 
paid by a worker with such an earnings history and the benefits that such 
workers could expect to receive taking account of  expected mortality. 
The authors do not state what tax schedule or benefit formula they use. 
They make a number of simplifying assumptions about relative ages and 
labor force behavior of  husbands and wives. They accumulate payroll 
taxes at 3% real interest to age sixty-five, discount expected retirement 
benefits at the same real rate to age sixty-five, and deflate the difference 
to 1977 dollars. They sum these differences within and across cohorts. 
They disregard workers who die before age sixty-five,  and they ignore all 
benefits other than retirement benefits paid to workers and spouses or 
survivors’ benefits paid to the spouses of retirees. In other words, they 
disregard  all benefits paid  on behalf of  workers decedent before age 
sixty-five and all benefits paid to children and other relatives of  retirees 
except spouses. 
The policy alternatives that the authors explore flow from their belief, 
stated in  congressional  testimony  that  the redistribution  that  occurs 
trustees’ report.  Projection  11-B, which employs more  pessimistic but  not  implausible 
assumptions, shows a seventy-five  year deficit of  1.82% of payroll on a total cost of 14.07%, 
a 12.9% deficit. 
3. The authors assume  that inflation proceeds  at 7% per year,  but because  of  the 
indexing features of social security, the results should be quite insensitive to variations in the 
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within the social security system is hidden and excessive and that the 
increase in  life expectancy experienced  in recent decades justifies in- 
creases in the age at which unreduced benefits may be claimed. I shall 
return to these judgments later. 
The first policy alternative-Trans-would  pay benefits to workers 
age thirty-five or older equal in present value only to the accumulated 
value of payroll taxes paid by them or by their employers, plus interest. 
Workers younger than thirty-five would be treated as they are under 
current law. Thus older workers would be denied past service credits or 
immaturity benefits to which they are entitled under current law, and the 
benefit formula would be converted from one that is progressive with 
respect to average covered earnings into one that is proportional with 
respect to taxes paid. 
It is clear to me that such a change has no practical interest whatsoever 
as a guide to policy. It changes the rules of the game for older workers, 
inflicting benefit reductions as large as 87% for workers over age sixty- 
five and 63% for workers age fifty-five to sixty-four, while leaving benefits 
of  workers under thirty-five unaffected. That would mean reducing the 
average benefit paid to newly retired workers in August 1980 from its 
actual level of $361.77 per month to $47.03 for workers sixty-five  or older 
and to $133.85 for workers fifty-five to sixty-four. 
Having been confronted by  a solid phalanx of  fourteen bipartisanly 
hostile congressmen when I testified on behalf of the comparatively tame 
proposal to tax half of social security benefits, I would relish sitting in the 
audience when the authors testified on behalf of  this proposal-but  I 
would not want my children to witness the carnage. 
In fact, I trust, the authors do not really regard such a change as sound 
policy. Rather, it is an effective device to use in a simulation exercise to 
illustrate the size and distribution of  immaturity benefits. They are the 
dominant portion of  benefits for the oldest cohorts, are a diminishing 
fraction for younger cohorts, and turn negative for the youngest workers, 
who  are assumed to spend their  entire working lives under  a single 
system. The negative value of social security for the youngest cohorts is a 
frequent, but misleading finding, and I shall comment on it below. 
The  second policy alternative-Trans  80-is  similar and tells much the 
same story. Under this alternative all workers would be paid benefits 
equal to the accumulated value of taxes plus interest, and taxes would be 
raised sufficiently-1.5  percentage points in the authors’ calculations- 
to bring the system into long-term balance. This simulation yields essen- 
tially the same results as the preceding one because the major difference 
is that the system is also changed for the youngest cohorts, but that 
change matters little because they do not receive immaturity benefits of 
any size anyway. 
Two other alternatives-Tax  80 and Tax 2030-leave  benefits un- 
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The first increases payroll taxes by  1.7 percentage points in 1980, the 
second by 3.9 percentage points in 2030. 
The final policy change-Ret-adds  a maximum of three years to the 
working lives of every worker. In contrast to the elimination of immatur- 
ity benefits for some or all workers, this change reduces benefits for all 
classes of  workers-by  8.5 to 13% for different cohorts. 
Critique 
The method of analysis used by Boskin, Avrin, and Cone is an entirely 
appropriate way to answer a particular question. That question is, Will a 
particular worker, with a particular assumed earnings history and family 
arrangements, get cash benefits worth more or less in present value terms 
than the taxes he and his employer pay? This question  is frequently 
asked, and it is of  some interest; but I do not believe that it is the right 
question to ask about the equity of  the social security system, and it is not 
the question that the authors attempt to answer. The authors ask how 
social security affects particular cohorts of workers, and for this question 
their methods are inadequate. 
Rates of  return.  In judging whether social security provides particular 
workers with a fair or an unfair return, it is important to include the value 
of insurance protection that does not actually lead to cash payments. We 
all know  that private  insurance entails selling costs and profits that 
together form a wedge between the present value of premiums and the 
present value of cash benefits actually paid, the so-called load factor. The 
fact that such a load factor exists and often is sizable does not prove that 
insurance is a bad buy. In fact, people continue to buy fire and health 
insurance, despite the fact that such load factors assure them that they 
will get back less, on the average, than they paid in, because insurance 
provides valuable protection against risk, even when the feared eventual- 
ity does not occur. The individual who never makes a claim under his fire 
insurance may be very well served, although the present expected value 
of  claims by  all people so  insured is less than the sum of  all premiums 
(because of  the load factor). Furthermore, social security, alone among 
all assets, provides covered workers full protection against inflation risk 
and capital market risk caused by variations in interest rates. Thus, in 
order to calculate whether social security is a good buy or not, one should 
calculate (a)  the present expected value of benefits prospectively taking 
account of  the probability of various outcomes, and (b)  the value of the 
insurance protection, including certain unique features of social security, 
such as complete protection against both inflation and capital market risk 
attributable to variations  in  interest  rates.  Thus, for the purpose of 
deciding whether social security is a good or a bad buy for individual 
workers, a proper calculation must be done prospectively and it must 
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The authors of this paper take a retrospective look, and they disregard 
the value of social security as insurance. For this reason, their estimates 
say little about whether social security is a good or a bad buy for indi- 
vidual workers except in those cases where benefits so clearly exceed 
taxes that there can be no room for quibble. 
The authors, however,  do not  look  at individual workers  (except 
briefly, in tables 7.4 and 7.5). Rather they look at cohorts and at the 
system as a whole. If  one is interested in calculating the value of  social 
security for cohorts, however, the same considerations arise as for indi- 
viduals. The value of  social security to today’s twenty-five to thirty-four 
year olds consists of the expected value of benefits that they will receive as 
retirees or that their dependents or survivors will receive as a result of 
their retirement or  death, plus the utility gain from reduced risk. As 
noted above, the authors do not attempt such estimates. The value of 
social security should include the value of protection against inflation and 
capital market risk and the insurance protection against various contin- 
gencies. It has been estimated, for example, that indexed bonds would 
sell at real interest rates much below those on ordinary bonds of similar 
maturity. Until such time as we enable other insurers to provide fully 
indexed benefits by  issuing index bonds or by  some other device, this 
important attribute of  social security should figure prominently in eval- 
uating whether it is a good or a bad buy for cohorts. 
The negative value of social security for the youngest cohorts reported 
in this study results (disregarding the crudity of  the estimates) from the 
absence of  immaturity benefits and use of  a 3% real interest rate. The 
authors do  not  justify  this  rate.  The  Social Security Administration 
assumes a real interest rate of 2.1% after 1995 and less before. They do 
not justify that rate. I suspect that relatively few individual investors have 
earned real net (or even gross) of tax returns of  as much as 3% lately on 
their portfolios. The old natural constant of  3% may reassert itself, but 
analysts should tell potential social security beneficiaries how they can 
earn such rates before they use them to discount streams of benefits and 
taxes. 
If  we disregard past service credits, we all know from Samuelson that 
the steady-state rate of  return to pay-as-you-go social insurance is the 
sum of the rates of  growth of population and real wages. We are not in a 
steady state; but all that the negative present value calculations of  the 
authors show is that 3% exceeds the appropriate weighted implicit rate of 
growth of population and real wages. It is worth comparing the results of 
Boskin, Avrin, and Cone with those of my colleague Louise Russell. She 
finds that if  taxes are set at whatever rate is necessary to assure payment 
of  retirement benefits promised under current law, the internal rate of 
return declines but remains positive for all cohorts. Her calculations also 
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The deficit.  The most striking statistic in this paper is the estimate of the 
overall deficit of the social security system, 632 billion 1977 dollars. Or  to 
bring matters more up-to-date, 987 billion 1981 dollars. What does this 
mean? 
In one sense it means nothing because, as noted above, the system 
simulated in this paper differs in essential ways from the actual social 
security system. In fact, the estimated deficit measured as a percent of 
payroll is close to official estimates, and they indicate that presently 
promised social security benefits will cost more than the taxes we have 
legislated will support. 
The actual deficit as estimated by the social security actuaries and the 
similar deficit estimated by  the authors may be presented in different 
ways. The officially estimated deficit is equal to .93% of wages subject to 
payroll over the next seventy-five years (compared to the 1.7% estimate 
of the authors). It is equal to 0.4% of gross national product over the next 
seventy-five years.  It is equal to 3.39% of  covered payroll during the 
period 2030-54. It is equal to 1.2% of  gross national product over the 
same twenty-five year period. 
Six  hundred thirty-two billion dollars is a large number. But so is 
$219,600 billion, the present value of  gross national product measured 
over the next seventy-five years under the assumption that nominal GNP 
is discounted at the same interest rate by which it grows. 
One or two percent of GNP is a large number, but it is worth keeping in 
mind that in 1978 government expenditures claimed 11.4% more of GNP 
in France than in the United States, 9.2% more in Germany than in the 
United States, 25% more in Sweden than in the United States, and 9.9% 
less in Japan than in the United States. Moreover, the proportion of GNP 
absorbed by government rose during the eight years from 1970 to 1978  by 
8.8 percentage points in France, 9.7 percentage points in Germany, 20 
percentage points in Sweden, 9 percentage points in Japan,  and  1.8 
percentage points in the United States. 
It may be that the rest of you are prepared to endorse the authors of this 
paper in describing a deficit that can be removed by an increase in taxes 
equal to less than one-half of  1% of  gross national product over the next 
seventy-five years, an increase that both the United States and other 
nations have undertaken in a couple of years, as “large,” “untenable,” 
“extremely large,” “overwhelming,” “huge,” “massive,” “immense” or 
just plain “enormous.” One can only admire such rhetorical vigor. 
Policy. Instead of  argumentation by  thesaurus, however, the issue of 
what  changes should be  made in the social security system deserves 
straightforward analysis and discussion, certainly at scholarly meetings. 
One of  the authors of  this paper has taken public stands on long-term 
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tions. The positions are (a)  to divide the social security system into two 
parts, one of which would return to covered retirees an annuity with the 
same present value as that of taxes paid by the worker and his employers, 
and one of which would be a negative income tax for the aged; and (b)  to 
increase the number of  years of  work by  three years. In practice, the 
working-life proposal would be implemented by an increase from sixty- 
five to sixty-eight in the age at which unreduced benefits are paid. The 
first proposal would eliminate both immaturity benefits and the “tilt,” or 
redistributive, component of the benefit formula. I regard the elimination 
of  past service credits as so improbable and as such poor policy as not to 
deserve serious discussion. 
The question of whether redistribution to the low-income aged should 
be  carried out through  an entitlement program  or an income tested 
program is more serious. To eliminate such redistribution while preserv- 
ing past service credits, one would establish a benefit formula that paid 
retirees  a  benefit  related  proportionally  rather than progressively to 
average earnings. Such a modification in the social security benefit for- 
mula could be used to accomplish two distinct objectives. The first would 
be to reduce the amount of  redistribution from current workers to re- 
tirees with low current income. The second would be to improve the 
accuracy with which a given amount of  redistribution is accomplished. 
The latter objective would be  achieved if  one established a negative 
income tax for the low-income aged that provided this group with the 
same total resources (or possibly even more) than the present system 
does. Savings would result because payment of  benefits to people with 
low average past earnings, but adequate current income or  wealth, would 
be curtailed. In previous conversations Michael Boskin has told me that 
he has no interest in reducing the amount of  redistribution to the low- 
income elderly and indeed would increase it by liberalizing the benefits 
paid under supplemental security income, the present negative income 
tax for the elderly. 
The motivation for moving to a two-tier system, therefore, is in part to 
eliminate or to reduce the payment of redistributive benefits to workers 
who have had low covered earnings but have adequate current resources. 
Another motive, enunciated in this paper, is the clarification for public 
debate of  the degree of  redistribution  carried out through public pro- 
grams. Presumably, such clarification would affect the amount or charac- 
ter of  redistribution over time. 
The elimination of  mistargeted benefits is a real gain; and it may be 
important. Universal coverage by  social security of  federal, state, and 
local employees would end much of the present mistargeting by depriving 
government employees of the privilege of  seeming to be low-wage work- 
ers when earnings from brief periods of  post-civil  service covered em- 
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two-tier system would provide a residual of  improved targeting. I do not 
know how large it would be nor do the authors nor does anyone else, 
because the analysis of  how much targeting would be improved has not 
been done. 
Moving to a two-tier system would also generate costs. The costs would 
take two forms. The first entails real resources, not misdirected transfers. 
The reduction of entitlements would increase the number of people who 
would apply for means-tested benefits. Means-tested programs cost more 
to administer than do entitlements, about 10%  of the amount transferred 
under the former compared with 2% under the latter. I do not know what 
the total increase in costs of  administration would be nor do the authors 
nor does anyone else, because the analysis of  how much administrative 
costs would rise has not been done. 
The second kind of  cost is a transfer cost. The take-up rate on means- 
tested programs is much lower than that of entitlements. As a result some 
fraction of those legally entitled to means-tested benefits would not claim 
them because of stigma or administrative difficulties. I do not know how 
many people would fall into this category, nor do I know how this loss (or 
the losses suffered by  those who would apply despite filing costs and 
stigma) should be weighed nor do the authors of  this paper nor does 
anyone else, because the analysis has not been done. 
It may be that the benefits would outweigh the costs; I doubt it. But my 
real point is that no one has done the analysis necessary to justify the 
radical change to our most important social program advanced by  the 
authors of  this paper and by others. Congress should not be expected to 
overhaul our largest social program  just  to fulfill the logically sound 
principle we all learned in graduate school that full achievement of policy 
goals requires one independent policy for each independent objective. 
I cannot resist observing that if  one wishes to sort out redistributional 
and earnings replacement objectives, one can  achieve this objective, 
without incurring either of  the costs I have just described, by means of  a 
double-decker plan: a universal demogrant for the aged and disabled, 
combined  with  a  benefit  proportional  to  earnings  and  with  suitable 
changes in the positive tax system. 
One  of the authors of this paper (Boskin) has also endorsed an increase 
by three years in the age at which unreduced benefits are paid. He does so 
because life expectancy has increased, is likely to continue to increase, 
and may in the author’s opinion increase more than demographers pro- 
ject. He and his coauthors conclude that an increase in the age at which 
unreduced benefits are paid is desirable. 
I have supported the enactment now of such an increase, to take effect 
around the turn of  the century, but I am far less certain than the authors 
about the desirability of  such an increase. The increase in  the costs of 
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important, even if  they do not deserve the rather inflated rhetoric em- 
ployed by the authors. It is important that decisions be made now that 
permit the generation that will have to pay those costs to make decisions 
unencumbered by unbreakable commitments to benefits that will require 
rising taxes. I strongly suspect that those generations will vote the higher 
taxes and elect to pay benefits approximating what is promised under 
current law. All public opinion polls to date support that contention: 
people of  all ages overwhelmingly indicate that they would rather pay 
higher social security taxes than curtail benefits. 
But attitudes do change. And if  we want to preserve the option to 
increase the retirement age at all, it is a political fact that very lengthy 
notice must be given of such an increase. However, those of us who favor 
putting  on the books  an increase  in the age of  first entitlement for 
unreduced benefits should keep in mind the comments made by one of 
our colleagues, William C. Hsaio: “Too frequently those who advocate 
later retirement  policy are armchair theorists.  Their jobs require the 
physical exertion of sitting at a desk, lifting a 3-ounce pencil, in a modern 
air-conditioned office. The mental exertion consists of reading and writ- 
ing memorandums and conducting discourse through a telephone line. 
They have never experienced the exhaustion of lifting 50 pound boxes for 
8 hours a day, or continuously operating a pneumatic press. Yet they 
assume 65-year old workers can continue to lift those weights or operate a 
heavy machine until they reach age 68.”4 
Unless we are able to design income support to deal with those who 
retire involuntarily before age sixty-five, who become physically incap- 
able of performing their jobs, or who lose their jobs and cannot find new 
ones late in their working lives, I submit that no increase in the age at 
which unreduced benefits are paid will or should come into effect. 
I regret that the authors did not choose to analyze the conversion from 
wage to price indexing of  the formula used for computing initial entitle- 
ments, a proposal whose immediate adoption Boskin has supported and 
whose deferred adoption I have supported. 
4.  Testimony to the Subcommittee on  Oversight of  the Committee  on  Ways and Means, 
House of  Representatives, 96th Congress, 2d Session, Serial 96-116,  p. 39. 